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SUMMARY:
... In the six years since Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing Project jointly released a report on felon
disenfranchisement in the United States, some public and legislative attention has been focussed on the issue. ... Part III
discusses a recent Canadian decision which found that country's prisoner disenfranchisement law unconstitutional. ...
The Canadian government had defended the ban on prisoner voting by asserting that disenfranchisement (1) enhances
the general purposes of the criminal sanction and (2) promotes civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law. ...
When the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a prisoner disenfranchisement law in Sauve, it paid particular attention
to the constitutive function of voting, citing with approval the words of the South African Constitutional Court that "the
vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood. ... "Getting Out the (Prison) Vote":
Implementing Prisoner Voting Rights A theme in the debate over prisoner voting rights in Canada is how to administer
and facilitate prison votes so that the franchise might have some instrumental effect. Even where prisoners are permitted
by law to vote, voter turnout remains low, as it is in those U.S. states allowing some prisoners to vote. ...
TEXT:
[*73]
I. Introduction
In the six years since Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing Project jointly released a report n1 on felon
disenfranchisement n2 in the United States, some public and legislative attention has been focussed on the issue. n3 At a
time when chronically low voter turnout n4 and racially-polarized voting n5 are harsh realities, the fact that state laws
bar millions of American citizens from voting - in many cases, for life - is startling. The size and racial composition of
the disenfranchised population indicate that these laws should be carefully scrutinized. Felon disenfranchisement laws
bar more than 3.9 million people from voting, a disproportionate share of which are African American men. n6
The practice of disenfranchising prisoners is neither limited to the United States, nor universal. Denmark, Israel,
South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland are just some of the countries that place no restrictions on prisoners' right to
vote. n7 Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom currently practice criminal disenfranchisement in a more limited
way than the United States, n8 barring only certain offenders from voting, and only while incarcerated.
Criminal disenfranchisement n9 has its roots in the punishment of "civil death," [*74] imposed for criminal
offences under Greek, Roman, Germanic and later Anglo-Saxon law. English law developed the related punishment of
attainder which resulted in forfeiture of all property, inability to inherit or devise property, and loss of all civil rights.
n10 These principles were transplanted to the British colonies which later became Canada and the United States. n11

Calls for reform of disenfranchisement laws in the United States focus primarily on the plight of individuals
released from prison who are living in the community n12 as well as on the racial impact of felon disenfranchisement.
n13 This paper challenges the dominant view in the United States that disenfranchising any prisoners is still sound
public policy. A brief look north of the 49th parallel reveals that Canadian courts have recently confronted this question.
In October 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down as unconstitutional a federal ban on prisoner voting. n14
This paper draws on the Canadian experience with a rights-based rejection of prisoner disenfranchisement in making the
argument that the ballot box should be opened to all prisoners in the United States.
Opponents of disenfranchisement often highlight the important symbolic or psychic impact of disenfranchising
individuals in societies that purport to value universal adult suffrage, arguing that disenfranchisement brands or labels
criminals as less than full persons who are unworthy of the franchise. n15 These arguments are [*75] powerful in the
context of ex-felon disenfranchisement where the individuals in question have completed their punishment and, as such,
have "paid their debt to society." The arguments for extending the vote to ex-felons are compelling and will not be
repeated in detail here. n16 However, in taking up the important work of correcting this injustice, scholars and
advocates have left largely unchallenged the law and policy that justifies disenfranchising the two million individuals
n17 currently incarcerated in the United States. n18 In response to the highly symbolic and expressive arguments made
for denying prisoners the vote (such as, for example, the justification that prisoners are morally unfit to exercise the
franchise or that disenfranchisement expresses society's disapproval of criminal acts), opponents of disenfranchisement
have cited the symbolic and psychic benefits prisoners receive by being included in the electorate. n19
When it comes to considering the potential impact of extending the franchise to prisoners, advocates of prisoner
voting rights tend to minimize the practical effect of these votes, stating that prisoner votes are unlikely to be
statistically significant n20 and emphasizing that there is no evidence to indicate that prisoners (or [*76] even exprisoners) will hold views different from the "mainstream" on criminal justice issues. n21
Yet criminal disenfranchisement affects not only the individuals who are disenfranchised and effectively rendered
second-class citizens. It affects us all because voting is not just symbolic. It has an instrumental function; it is the
primary means by which individuals and groups express their preferences and alter law and policy.
This instrumental n22 function of voting often figures prominently in the justifications for disenfranchising
incarcerated prisoners when it is suggested that prisoners will vote as a bloc for lenient criminal law policies, will vote
against the "public interest," n23 and will swamp the votes of law-abiding citizens living near prisons, particularly
where prisons are located in small, rural communities.
This paper takes seriously the objection that allowing prisoners to vote may have an impact on the outcome of
elections or on the development of law and policy, given the extraordinarily high incarceration rate currently a reality in
the United States. The reality that prisoners may have an impact on the outcome of elections is an argument in favour of
allowing them to vote rather than against it. A progressive critique or constitutional challenge of prisoner
disenfranchisement should call attention to the instrumental, as well as symbolic and constitutive functions of voting,
and must defend the importance of having the views and preferences of prisoners voiced at the ballot box. This paper
attempts to do that.
Part II briefly surveys felon disenfranchisement laws in the United States. Part III discusses a recent Canadian
decision which found that country's prisoner disenfranchisement law unconstitutional. The Canadian experience is
instructive for its attention to, and ultimate rejection of, a number of common justifications for maintaining prisoner
disenfranchisement laws. To understand the harm of prisoner disenfranchisement, Part IV examines three elements of
the right to vote in American law (participation, aggregation and governance), as well as two distinct functions of the
right to vote, namely the constitutive function and the instrumental function. Part V provides an analysis of the various
constitutive and instrumental reasons for recognizing the right of prisoners to participate in the electoral process. Part VI
offers some potential answers to the practical and administrative objections often cited by opponents of prisoner voting,
drawing on the Canadian experience, and Part VII concludes with some thoughts on the prospects for change.
[*77]
II. Voteless Millions: The State(s) of Disenfranchisement in the United States
The sheer number of individuals who cannot vote due to criminal disenfranchisement laws points to the need to think
seriously and critically about the practice. Fellner and Mauer report that approximately 3.9 million American citizens
are disenfranchised, 1.4 million of them permanently, as a result of state felon disenfranchisement laws. n24 In forty-

eight states and the District of Columbia, criminal disenfranchisement laws deny the vote to all convicted adult felons in
prison. n25 A majority of states extend disenfranchisement to include ex-prisoners on probation, n26 on parole, n27 or
even permanently, n28 long past the time when offenders have "paid their debt to society." Department of Justice
officials have called the aggregate of felon and ex-felon disenfranchisement laws across the states a national
"crazyquilt" of differing standards. n29
The statistics are even more disturbing when one looks at the racial composition of the disenfranchised population.
Thirty-six percent of that population consists of African American men; in ten states, at least one in five African
American men is disenfranchised, n30 and in seven of those states, n31 at least one in four African American men is
disenfranchised for life. n32 There is also increasing attention to the web of other "collateral consequences" of criminal
conviction, n33 such as disqualification from welfare benefits, public housing, and employment opportunities, that
combine with felon disenfranchisement to relegate poor and racialized individuals, families and communities to a
degraded form of citizenship and public participation.
As a matter of constitutional law, the United States Supreme Court has said that felon disenfranchisement laws do
not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, so long as they were not enacted purposefully to deprive racial
minorities of the right to vote. n34 In fact, the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. [*78] Ramirez n35 that felon
disenfranchisement is "affirmatively sanctioned" by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides, inter alia:
When the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. n36
The majority's reasoning is not particularly convincing. In fact, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was rendered
largely superfluous by the Fifteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court noted as much in Reynolds v. Sims, n37 when
it essentially "read out" the section from the Fifteenth Amendment, relying only on the Equal Protection Clause in
Section 1. In any event, as Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in dissent in Richardson:
By providing a special remedy for disenfranchisement of a particular class of voters in 2, Congress did not approve of
all election discrimination to which the 2 remedy was applicable, and such discriminations thus are not forever
immunized from evolving standards of equal protection scrutiny. n38
Regaining the vote for former prisoners, let alone prisoners currently serving sentences, is sure to be an uphill battle whether fought in the courts or legislatures - given the state of popular opinion and political discourse on criminal [*79]
justice issues n39 and in light of the sheer number of different state laws. Nevertheless, the moderate publicity
associated with the Losing the Vote study in 1998 led to a flurry of reform initiatives in state legislatures, in Congress
and in the courts. n40 However, none of these reforms aims to abolish disenfranchisement for incarcerated prisoners.
n41
III. A Look North: The Rejection of Prisoner Disenfranchisement in Canada
The United States and Canada share a common law heritage, a liberal democratic political culture, and a commitment
to universal adult suffrage, all of which make the comparison of criminal disenfranchisement laws potentially useful.
n42 In addition, while Canada incarcerates 102 adults per 100,000, much fewer than the U.S. rate of 686 per 100,000,
n43 Canada tends to be more "tough on [*80] crime" than most European countries. n44
The twenty year-old Charter of Rights and Freedoms n45 has provided grounds for a number of recent, high-profile
challenges to prisoner disenfranchisement laws. The interpretive framework for Charter claims adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada requires the government to articulate clearly its objectives for infringing a right and to prove that the
infringement is rationally connected to the objective and is the least restrictive means for achieving that objective. n46
As a result, Canadian courts have subjected the normative arguments for prisoner disenfranchisement to close scrutiny
in a way that has not occurred in American felon disenfranchisement cases.
Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "every citizen of Canada has the right to
vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for
membership therein." Claiming a violation of that right, Richard Sauve, a prisoner serving a life sentence for murder,
challenged a provision of the Canada Elections Act n47 barring prisoners serving sentences of two years or more from

voting in federal elections. n48 [*81] In a strongly-worded decision, a majority of Canada's highest court held that
prisoner disenfranchisement laws, even those limited to longer-serving prisoners, unjustifiably infringe the right to vote,
a right that is "fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside." n49
The Canadian government had defended the ban on prisoner voting by asserting that disenfranchisement (1)
enhances the general purposes of the criminal sanction and (2) promotes civic responsibility and respect for the rule of
law. n50 This position was a change from earlier prisoner voting rights litigation in which the government had
unsuccessfully defended a broader, blanket ban on all prisoner voting on the basis that excluding prisoners promoted a
"decent and responsible electorate." n51 That argument, based on the moral character of voters, was rejected as
anachronistic and inconsistent with the values in the Charter. n52
The majority in the recent Sauve decision viewed the new objectives of enhancing punishment and promoting civic
responsibility as too symbolic and abstract to justify overriding a right as important as voting. n53 Chief Justice
McLachlin noted that "the government has failed to identify particular problems that require denying the right to vote,"
n54 expressing concern that, "if Parliament can infringe a crucial right such as the right to vote simply by offering
symbolic and abstract reasons, judicial review becomes vacuously constrained or reduced to a contest of "our symbols
are better than your symbols.'" n55
The government's evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of six expert [*82] witnesses, n56 a number of them
American, who testified about the moral and philosophical justifications for prisoner disenfranchisement laws. These
witnesses sought to relate their evidence to the two objectives of disenfranchisement advanced by the government:
promoting civic responsibility and enhancing the criminal sanction.
To support the objective of enhancing the criminal sanction, the government experts testified that the sentencing
principles of retribution and moral education were served by disenfranchising prisoners. Under a theory of retribution,
punishment is meant to "negate the wrong" committed by the offender. While nothing can literally negate a wrong, the
act of punishing is an attempt to express something about the crime and to express society's condemnation of the
criminal's act. n57 Jean Hampton - a moral philosopher and the key government witness whose evidence the trial judge,
appellate court, and Supreme Court dissent found persuasive - testified that, in committing a serious crime, an offender
asserts a feeling of power or mastery over a victim. Therefore, the law must assert something in response.
Through the imposition of disenfranchisement as additional punishment, Hampton imagines the victim of crime
and the community to be symbolically expressing to a criminal that they will not tolerate the violation of trust and
societal values that the criminal conduct represents. Therefore, as part of the criminal's punishment, he or she will not be
entitled to participate in the decision-making process which is committed to those values. n58 Hampton suggests that
this process "morally educates" the offender. n59
The arguments for retribution and moral education rely heavily on the expressive power of disenfranchisement. The
majority in Sauve agreed that disenfranchisement sent a message, but not a positive one:
[*83]
Denying citizen law-breakers the right to vote sends the message that those who commit serious breaches are no longer
valued members of the community, but instead are temporary outcasts from our system of rights and democracy. More
profoundly, it sends the unacceptable message that democratic values are less important than punitive measures
ostensibly designed to promote order. n60
On the broader question of whether disenfranchisement is a constitutionally permissible form of punishment, the Chief
Justice said,
The argument, stripped of its rhetoric, proposes that it is open to Parliament to add a new tool to its arsenal of punitive
implements - denial of constitutional rights. I find this notion problematic. I do not doubt that Parliament may limit
constitutional rights in the name of punishment, provided it can justify that limitation. But it is another thing to say that
a particular class of people for a particular period of time will completely lose a particular constitutional right. That is
tantamount to saying that the affected class is outside the full protection of the Charter. n61
In advancing the second purported objective, promoting civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, two of the
government's witnesses advanced theories that criminal behaviour indicated disrespect for the welfare of fellow
members of society, for the rule of law, and for the electoral process. n62 They then reasoned back from that

proposition to conclude that denying the vote to people who have committed serious crimes makes the franchise seem
more valuable both to those prisoners and to the general public, and promotes the virtues of responsible citizenship. n63
Again, the Supreme Court majority disagreed, saying that the government understood the connection between
obeying the law and having a voice in making the law "exactly backwards." n64 The right of all citizens to vote is the
basis of democratic legitimacy. n65 Therefore, when the state disenfranchises a group of citizens, it undermines its
ability to function as the legitimate representative of those citizens. n66 In doing, so, it "erodes the basis of its right to
convict and punish law-breakers." n67
[*84] In any event, the government's assumption that civic responsibility is best promoted by excluding prisoners
from opportunities for civic engagement was contradicted by Richard Sauve's own experience in prison. While
incarcerated, Sauve pursued two university degrees and volunteered with charities and prison organizations n68 that
mirror classic "civic associations." n69 A jury of local citizens and the correctional system itself rewarded Sauve for his
high level of civic engagement by granting his application for an early parole hearing and then granting him parole ten
years before he would normally be eligible, at least in part on the basis of his clean prison record and community
involvement. n70 As noted by the majority in Sauve, "to deny prisoners the right to vote is to lose an important means
of teaching them democratic values and social responsibility." n71
The impact of Sauve will extend beyond the federal law found unconstitutional. The fact that this was the second
time the Supreme Court of Canada had rejected a prisoner's voting rights claim, n72 combined with the strong language
used to denounce government's purported objectives, makes it unlikely that any prisoner voting ban will pass
constitutional muster, n73 including a number of provincial disenfranchisement laws. n74 The decision could also be
persuasive in any future litigation over prisoner voting rights in countries with similar [*85] constitutional guarantees.
n75
To assess whether anything can be learned from the Canadian experience, n76 it is necessary to consider how
American law defines the "right to vote" and, in particular, whether incarcerated persons are (or should be) included in
the class of people who hold that right to vote.
IV. The Right to Vote: Elements and Functions
A. The Elements of Voting: Participation, Aggregation and Governance
The starting point for understanding the right to vote is the United States Constitution. The Constitution does not
contain an express "right to vote," n77 nor does it require elections to be held or set qualifications for voters. n78
Instead, it prohibits discrimination in allocation of the franchise based on race n79 sex, n80 and, to a limited degree,
age. n81 Therefore, while the right to vote is not expressly guaranteed, once governments decide to hold elections, adult
citizens are understood to have a right to participate equally with other adult citizens in those elections. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly spoken of a right to [*86] vote, calling it "fundamental" n82 and saying that "no right is
more precious in a free country." n83
Pamela Karlan n84 has identified three strands of voting rights jurisprudence which indicate that the right to vote
includes three interrelated but distinct elements: n85 participation, aggregation, and governance. n86 "Participation" is
another word for enfranchisement and simply entails the right to cast a ballot that is counted in an election. n87 The
element of "aggregation" recognizes that voting functions primarily combine individual preferences to reach a collective
decision, usually the selection of one or more representatives. n88 Finally, the concept of "governance" understands
voting as an integral part of the practice and process of decision-making through elected representatives, seeing voting
as part of an ongoing public policy conversation rather than a declaratory event on election day. n89
Over the years, the right to participate has grounded successful challenges to various restrictions on the franchise
based on race, sex, literacy, wealth, mental competence, residency or moral character. Since voting was characterized as
a fundamental interest by the Supreme Court in the mid 1960s, n90 limitations on voting participation have had to pass
strict scrutiny review. n91 Karlan suggests that the Court's jurisprudence on voter participation embodies a value of
"civic inclusion," meaning "a sense of connectedness to the community and of equal political dignity; greater readiness
to acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence broader consent and legitimacy." n92
The right to participate is understood to be "outcome-independent" in the sense that courts have not usually
inquired into whether disenfranchised persons (such as African Americans, short-term residents or illiterate people) are
likely to vote differently than the currently enfranchised population or whether broadening [*87] the franchise will
affect the outcome of elections. n93 Conversely, the right of aggregation is essentially "outcome-regarding" because it

is based on the idea that groups of voters must have a fair opportunity to elect their representatives of choice. n94 A
claim for prisoner voting rights is usually seen as implicating only the participatory element of voting, n95 yet the
justifications for denying the vote to prisoners have not been content-neutral or outcome-independent. A prisoner voting
rights claim must address the (often unarticulated) concern that prisoners' votes will swamp those of "law-abiding"
citizens and must take seriously the possibility that prisoners may have policy preferences different from other groups in
society. n96 Given the sheer number of incarcerated people in the United States, n97 their votes are not likely to be
without impact. n98
B. The Functions of Voting: Instrumental and Constitutive
Leaving aside the rights of aggregation and governance, the participatory component of the franchise can be understood
to have more than one function. At a basic level, participation in the act of voting on election day is the primary means
by which individuals express their preferences and views about the way they wish their society to be ordered and
governed. It is the means by which individuals (and, through aggregation, groups) express their "political will" and
direct governmental institutions. This instrumental concept of voting is generally content-neutral in the sense that it
purports not to allow individuals to be disenfranchised because of the presumed content of their votes. n99 Voting is a
means to gauge the political will, [*88] whatever the content of that will.
However, recalling Karlan's concept of "civic inclusion," a competing theory emphasizes the constitutive function
of voting. Disenfranchisement has been a powerful symbolic, as well as practical, method of excluding many groups
such as women and minority racial and religious groups. Therefore, disenfranchised individuals may seek the vote to
take part in a "meaningful participatory act through which individuals create and affirm their membership in the
community and thereby transform their identities both as individuals and as part of a greater collectivity." n100
1. Voting as Instrumental
When the United States Supreme Court describes the right to vote as fundamental and as "preservative of all other
rights," n101 it draws on liberal theory which ascribes particular importance to political rights. n102 The franchise
serves a gate-keeping function to allow a person to have some influence on the laws that govern him or her. n103 John
Rawls' first principle of "justice as fairness" is that each person must have an equal right to the most extensive system of
basic liberties. n104 Political liberties are fundamental to ensuring access to the political process which determines other
basic liberties. n105
This concept of the franchise figured prominently in the struggle for voting rights for African American people in
the civil rights movement of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. While there was an important symbolic effect of including
previously disenfranchised individuals in the electorate, the push for voting rights for African Americans was not
merely a symbolic matter. Lani Guinier notes the extent to which the African American voting rights movement in the
1950s and 60s was centered on a vision of Black political empowerment and based on a redistributive theory of
"representation and the right to participate." n106 Guinier calls the idea that voting rights were the key to African
American economic, political and social success the "Black Electoral Success Theory." n107 Under this theory, three
reasons were articulated for political participation: (1) to mobilize the African American community; (2) to promote a
social and economic agenda; and (3) to elect responsive officials. n108 Martin Luther King, Jr. described voting rights
in similar terms when he said,
[*89]
Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry the federal government about our basic rights ... Give us the
ballot and we will fill our legislative halls with men of goodwill ... Give us the ballot and we will help bring this nation
to a new society based on justice and dedicated to peace. n109
Unfortunately, the history of African American voting rights struggles reveals that "Black Electoral Success" was a
more elusive goal, one that would not be achieved by a campaign for formal participation in the electoral process alone.
Therefore, current minority voting rights litigation and lobbying tends to focus on the rights of aggregation and
governance, in the sense of making the votes cast by African Americans "count." However, with forty-five percent of
the U.S. prison population being African American n110 and thirteen percent of all African American men being barred
from voting due to felon disenfranchisement laws, n111 the loss of participatory rights has significant impact on the
instrumental value of African American votes.

Implicit in an instrumental concept of the franchise is the idea that government functions best when the views and
preferences of all its constituents are taken into account. However, the way one defines "membership" often justifies
barring certain persons from the franchise, even those who may have sufficient interest and capacity to exercise an
instrumentally useful vote. American states limit their membership for electoral purposes by using some citizenship,
residency, age, and mental capacity requirements for voters.
Residency requirements are perhaps the easiest to justify in the sense that membership in a community usually
implies a physical connection to that community. n112 Non-residents can have an interest (such as a property interest)
in a political community, but it is usually accepted that some form of residency requirement is necessary to define a
political unit (particularly in a federal system where political units are self-governing), n113 although residency
requirements must not be too broad. n114
On the surface, age and mental capacity thresholds also seem appropriate, although the precise location of those
thresholds is not obvious. It is likely that [*90] many teenagers, and probably some younger children, understand as
much about voting as many adults and are considerably more informed than many adult voters. Any line will be
arbitrary and it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether the age of eighteen is an appropriate line. n115
With respect to mental capacity, it may be that the very few individuals who cannot understand that the act of marking
an "X" on a ballot is the act of "voting" for a representative, do not have a strong claim to exercise that right. However,
beyond that point, line-drawing will be problematic and potentially over-inclusive. Courts should require that mental
competency requirements be minimal. n116
Citizenship requirements, like criminal disenfranchisement laws, are problematic because they are not based on
concerns about lack of capacity or interest. n117 At the local level, it is difficult to justify limiting the vote to citizens
other than as a means to encourage immigrants to become citizens. The argument for alien suffrage is often made, at
least in part, on the ground that equal obligations (i.e., the payment of taxes) should entail equal privileges (i.e., the right
to vote for the people who will spend those tax dollars). In cities with large immigrant populations, such as Los
Angeles, extending the franchise to non-citizens could have a discernable effect on electoral outcomes and on policy
choices. n118 Limiting the franchise to citizens may also contribute to a sense of exclusion among minority [*91]
groups. n119
The exclusion experienced by disenfranchised groups - historically in the case of African Americans, other
minority groups, and women, and currently in the case of non-citizens, prisoners and ex-prisoners - leads many to the
conclusion that voting serves more than just an instrumental function. It also serves a constitutive function.
2. Voting as Constitutive
Something other than a desire to inform the government of their individual policy choices likely motivated Black South
Africans to queue for hours and days in order to vote in the first post-Apartheid elections in 1994. When individuals
have been disenfranchised, the act of voting takes on significance beyond its instrumental function. In discussing the
historical meaning of citizenship in the U.S. context, Judith Shklar n120 suggests that for the disenfranchised and the
newly-enfranchised, gaining the right to vote was and is about belonging and standing as a member of society. n121
John Rawls also speaks of the "fundamental importance of self-respect" which is "rooted in our self-confidence as a
fully cooperating member of society capable of pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good." n122 That selfconfidence arises from our status of equal citizenship which is guaranteed by the fair value of the political liberties.
n123 In this way, the right to vote is fundamental not just in the pragmatic sense of enabling citizens to secure other
rights, but also for its symbolic value.
[*92]
V. Making the Case for Prisoner Voting Rights: Constitutive and Instrumental Reasons
A. The Constitutive Effect of Enfranchising Prisoners
Calls to extend the franchise to ex-felons in the United States and to incarcerated prisoners in Canada have appealed
strongly to the constitutive function of the franchise, particularly the notion that disenfranchisement profoundly affects a
person's dignity and relegates him or her to the status of second-class citizen or even sub-human. When the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down a prisoner disenfranchisement law in Sauve, it paid particular attention to the constitutive
function of voting, citing with approval the words of the South African Constitutional Court that "the vote of each and
every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says that every person counts." n124

In making the case for a Voting Rights Act claim against criminal disenfranchisement laws, Andrew Shapiro notes
that "the symbolic worth of enfranchisement should not be underestimated," n125 because it is a marker of citizenship
and participation with other members of society. George Fletcher has argued that criminal disenfranchisement should be
abandoned because it operates in the United States as a "technique for reinforcing the branding of felons as the
untouchable class of American society." n126 Joe Loya, a disenfranchised ex-felon living in California, describes the
relationship between the franchise, citizenship and personhood in similar terms:
Without a vote, a voice, I am a ghost inhabiting a citizen's space... . I want to walk calmly into a polling place with other
citizens, to carry my placid ballot into the booth, check off my choices, then drop my conscience in the common box.
n127
To many of its critics, the biggest wound inflicted by criminal disenfranchisement is the symbolic exclusion and
branding of offenders as unworthy members of society. The instrumental effect of prisoners' votes is minimized. The
suggestion that prisoners might have views and preferences different from other voters is considered unlikely or, at
least, not discussed as a factor in favour of extending the franchise to prisoners. n128
Yet concerns about the way that prisoners might vote play a role in the debate over disenfranchisement. One of the
commonly-invoked justifications for disenfranchisement laws is some variant of the theme that prisoners will vote
[*93] against the public interest, particularly on criminal law issues. In a 1967 felon disenfranchisement case, Green v.
Board of Elections, n129 Judge Friendly endorsed this view, apparently finding it self-evident:
It can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in
electing legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further
violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases. This is especially so when account is taken of the heavy
incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of organized crime. A contention that the equal protection clause requires
New York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges would not only be without merit but as
obviously so as anything can be. n130
George Fletcher labels these ideas "mystical" and "fanciful" and takes the view that they cannot "withstand a minute of
rational argument." n131 Fletcher and the court in Green had in mind ex-felons who were living in the community,
rather than current prisoners. However, in relation to prisoners' votes, the argument carries considerable force with, for
example, the residents of a rural community who live next to one or more large correctional facilities. n132
Even where prisoner voting is allowed, concerns about how prisoners might vote appear to lie behind rules that
determine the electoral districts in which inmate votes are counted. n133 For example, in the Canadian jurisdictions
where prisoners vote, laws usually deem a prisoner's ordinary residence or domicile to be his or her place of preincarceration residence. n134
B. The Instrumental Effect of Enfranchising Prisoners
Upon examination, the argument that prisoners' votes will be "subversive" can be turned on its head in favour of a
robust instrumental view of the right to vote. Criminal law, like other aspects of public policy, varies over time and is
continually undergoing a process of re-evaluation and revision as public attitudes change and are expressed by the
voting public. Examples abound. At various times over the past hundred years, the legal treatment of such practices as
abortion, drug use and sale, possession of alcohol, homosexual sex, and certain forms of sexual assault have shifted
from being criminal to non-criminal or vice verse as public attitudes change.
While it is not the case that voting is the only way that reformers can advocate [*94] changes to criminal or other
laws, our democratic system is built on the premise that change is best effected through the electoral and legislative
process, rather than through rebellion, rioting, or back-room influence. John Hart Ely speaks of the problem of the
political "ins" excluding and deciding the fate of the political "outs," n135 a process which hinders social and political
evolution. Ely goes on to say that we "cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out, and it is therefore incumbent on the
courts to ensure not only that no one is denied the vote for no reason, but also that where there is a reason (as there will
be) it had better be a convincing one." n136
It is for this reason that political rights are often considered "preferred rights" that form the foundation for other
rights. For example, in Canada, the right to vote in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was deliberately
placed outside of the potential application of Section 33, the so-called "legislative override" provision. Section 33

permits the federal or provincial governments to declare that a particular law operates notwithstanding the existence of a
Charter right that would normally render the law unconstitutional. n137 Rights such as freedom of expression, freedom
of association and equality, are subject to a potential legislative override, n138 but political rights were meant to exist
independent of changing public moods. n139
Justice Marshall suggested in dissent in Richardson v. Ramirez that the real purpose of ex-felon disenfranchisement
was a less than convincing one, namely "to keep former felons from voting because their likely voting pattern might be
subversive to the interests of an orderly society." n140 In rejecting that rationale, Justice Marshall emphasized the need
to treat the participatory right to vote as content-neutral, and his discussion in this regard is worth quoting at length:
The process of democracy is one of change. Our laws are not frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in the
process of revision in response to the needs of a changing society. The public interest, as conceived by the majority of
the voting public, is constantly undergoing reexamination. This Court's holding in Davis, supra, and Murphy, supra, that
a State may disenfranchise a class of voters to "withdraw all political influence from those who are practically hostile"
to the existing order, [*95] strikes at the very heart of the democratic process. A temporal majority could use such a
power to preserve inviolate its view of the social order simply by disenfranchising those with different views. Voters
who opposed the repeal of prohibition could have disenfranchised those who advocated repeal "to prevent persons from
being enabled by their votes to defeat the criminal laws of the country." ... Today, presumably those who support the
legalization of marihuana could be barred from the ballot box for the same reason. The ballot is the democratic system's
coin of the realm. To condition its exercise on support of the established order is to debase that currency beyond
recognition. n141
The idea of content-neutrality in allocating the franchise was affirmed by the Court in Carrington v. Rash n142 where it
struck down as unconstitutional a Texas law barring military personnel from voting in local elections because of an
alleged incompatibility of views between military and civilian residents. The Court held that it is unconstitutional for a
state to "fence out" a particular class of voters because of suspicions about the way they might vote. n143
A liberal democratic political system functions best when the views and preferences of all its members can be
expressed through the franchise. n144 When the views of one group are systematically cut out of the political process,
the public debate will be skewed, particularly if the views of members of the excluded group do not reflect the
distribution of views in the rest of the population. The disenfranchisement of prisoners removes from the criminal
policy debate the electoral influence of individuals who have personal experience with the application of that law, and
who arguably have much to contribute to that debate. n145 For example, one might reasonably suspect that prisoners
could have different views about extremely punitive criminal laws such as "Three Strikes" policies. Of course, any
differences that exist might not be enough to tip the scales in an election, n146 but if the distribution of views about
such policies is different among [*96] prisoners than in the general population, it could be a significant factor in some
elections or referenda.
Similarly, opponents of increasingly strict sentencing laws for certain drug offences often argue that such laws are
political, pointing to the reality that African Americans are convicted and sentenced under such laws at a rate
disproportionate to their share of the population. n147 Since many African Americans are locked up under those very
laws (or disenfranchised as ex-felons), they cannot contribute to the efforts to change the laws. It is left largely in the
hands of people in the jurisdiction who have never experienced the impact of the laws to effect legislative change. If
drug laws are at least partially political and the product of a certain social climate, then it seems appropriate that
individuals with experience under those laws not be barred from making and altering them.
It might be objected that prisoners have too large a stake in the criminal justice system to be neutral about the
issues. However, it is the government that must be neutral about the content of its citizens' votes, not the voters
themselves that must be neutral about the issues:
Bias does not disqualify people from voting. Indeed voting is precisely about expressing biases, loyalties, commitments,
and personal values. Excluding from the electorate those who have felt the sting of the criminal law obviously skews the
politics of criminal justice toward one side of the debate. n148
One might also question the empirical basis for suggesting that the distribution of views and preferences among
prisoners will not track the distribution of views and preferences in the relevant political community in which they
would vote. n149 [*97] Not surprisingly given their lack of political participation, there appears to have been no

scientific study of prisoner political views in the United States. However, we do know something about the
demographics of the prison population that may help us understand the political impact of disenfranchising prisoners.
n150
C. The Instrumental Effect in Racialized Communities
One cannot talk about voting rights or prisoners' rights in the United States without talking about race. It is no secret
that the population of inmates does not reflect the racial composition of the United States as a whole. Rather, it consists
of disproportionately large numbers of African American and Hispanic people. Forty-five percent of prison inmates are
African American and eighteen percent are Hispanic, compared to 12.3% and 12.5% of the general population
respectively. n151 Similarly, while one in sixty-three White males aged twenty-five to twenty-nine was in prison or jail
in 2001, the number is one in eight for African American men and one in twenty-three for Hispanic men. n152
The phenomenon of racial bloc voting in the United States is also well-documented, particularly in the South. n153
The fact that a majority of African Americans vote for Democratic candidates is also well-known. n154 Pamela Karlan
[*98] further notes that African Americans tend to be quite politically cohesive:
[African Americans] occupy a position similar to that of many other socially and politically cohesive groups, such as
"union-oriented workers, the university community, [and] religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our
heterogeneous cities and urban areas." To the extent that racially homogeneous social groups share political preferences,
a pluralistic political system that seeks to aggregate exogenous preferences cannot categorically exclude such groups
without sacrificing legitimacy. n155
On an issue such as affirmative action, African Americans tend to have different views than "White Americans," n156
a fact which may well translate into policy preferences in voting. There is also some indication that African Americans
may have different opinions and views with respect to policing than White Americans. n157 While a majority of the
Supreme Court has actively resisted, as a normative matter, the notion that African American voters have a distinct
political viewpoint, n158 evidence points to a contrary reality, at least with respect to support for the major political
parties.
If the content of African American votes is different from that of the wider population, or if the success of African
American candidates is dependant on the existence of an African American majority in a given district, the fact that
members of this group are disenfranchised in numbers disproportionate to their share of the population has serious
implications for the political process. n159
[*99] The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] appears to have recently
considered the potential impact that prisoners' votes might have in an election. As part of its 2000 drive to register as
many as four million new voters, the NAACP made efforts to register prisoners convicted of misdemeanours or
awaiting trial since state laws often disenfranchise only those convicted of felony offences. n160 The drive was aimed at
states such as North Carolina in which African Americans comprise approximately half of those convicted of
misdemeanours and nearly two-thirds of those convicted of felonies, while representing only twenty-two percent of the
state's population. n161
Finally, an inmate in a New York state prison made an instrumental argument for prisoner voting rights in a letter
to the editor of the New York Daily News in 1993 by highlighting his perception of the negative effect of
disenfranchisement on minority communities' political power:
We believe that the law that takes away a prisoner's right to vote has a crippling effect on so-called minority
communities' attempts at political empowerment... . So-called minorities are more likely than whites to be incarcerated
when convicted of the same crimes... . Allowing prisoners to vote would be a plus for black and Hispanic ambitions and maybe that is why it is not allowed. n162
D. Prisoners as Voters and Constituents: Making Politicians Accountable
Even if the distribution of views and preferences of the prison population accurately reflects those of the nonincarcerated population, and even in the absence of proven race discrimination, n163 there may be other salutary effects
on the [*100] political process if prisoners are included in the electorate.

Currently, there is little need for politicians to pay attention to criminal justice matters beyond being sensitive to
their constituents' concerns about controlling the crime that they perceive as increasing. n164 The conditions of prisons
and the effect of harsh sentencing laws on prisoners rarely figure in their strategic calculus. n165 Prisoners are no
politician's constituents. n166 In the current climate, there is little to gain, and much to lose, if a politician is seen as
being soft on crime. n167 While extending the franchise to prisoners would not likely alter that equation radically, there
is reason to believe that some politicians would take seriously their responsibility to visit their constituents in prison, to
educate themselves about the issues that face prisoners, and perhaps to take an interest in less punitive criminal law
reform. n168
In the Canadian province of Quebec, where provincial law permits all prisoners to vote, anecdotal evidence
indicates that at least some candidates have [*101] taken an interest in the prison vote. During the 1998 provincial
election campaign, Parti Quebecois candidate Raoul Duguay visited Cowansville Penitentiary, a federal prison which
houses many long-term inmates. n169 Under Quebec law which provides that inmates' votes are counted in their place
of domicile, n170 ninety-two inmates had designated the prison as their place of domicile. For Duguay, who was
running in that district, those ninety-two votes were significant enough to warrant meeting with inmates to discuss their
concerns. n171 The potential for this kind of interaction between prisoners and current or aspiring politicians raises
other issues that trouble opponents of prisoner enfranchisement, including the location where prisoners votes will be
counted and the potential security and administrative concerns associated with facilitating inmates' access to politicians
and to political information. These issues will be addressed below.
VI.
"Getting Out the (Prison) Vote": Implementing Prisoner Voting Rights
A theme in the debate over prisoner voting rights in Canada is how to administer and facilitate prison votes so that the
franchise might have some instrumental effect. Even where prisoners are permitted by law to vote, voter turnout
remains low, as it is in those U.S. states allowing some prisoners to vote. For example, Canada's Chief Electoral Officer
reports that only 5,194 (or 22.5%) of the 23,116 incarcerated persons in Canada who were eligible to vote in the
November 2000 federal election, n172 actually cast ballots. In the Canadian province of Ontario, only 28.9% of eligible
inmates cast ballots in the 1992 national constitutional referendum, compared with a turnout of seventy-two percent
across the province. n173 In Utah, where prisoners were permitted to vote until the state constitution was amended in
1998, n174 only ninety-five voters registered in Salt Lake County in 1996 and voter turnout by eligible inmates was
estimated at five percent. n175 A notable exception is the Canadian province of Quebec where voting by prisoners in
three elections in the early 1990s reached seventy-four percent. n176
[*102] In part, the low numbers might be seen as simply an exaggerated reflection of declining voter turnout
trends in the larger electorate in countries such as the United States n177 and Canada, n178 but that is not the only
explanation. In many jurisdictions, neither prison nor election officials take any action to facilitate prisoner voting. n179
Some citizen groups in the United States have attempted to fill this void. n180 However, without the involvement and
cooperation of public officials, the right to vote will remain illusory for many prisoners. In 1999, South African
government officials heard from their Constitutional Court that the "right to vote by its very nature imposes positive
obligations upon the legislature and the executive." n181 To make the right a reality, the government was ordered to
fulfil its corresponding duty to take all necessary measures to facilitate prisoner voting.
A. Where Should Prisoners Vote?
Whether prisoners' votes should be counted in their place of pre-incarceration residence or in the location of the prison
is an important aspect of the debate over prisoner enfranchisement. n182 It is significant because opponents of prisoner
enfranchisement cite the potential for large numbers of prisoners to swamp local voters in rural areas if prisoners are
permitted to vote in the prison district. n183 [*103] Prisoners also might want to have their votes counted in their
home districts if they have children and other family members with interests in schools, taxes, housing, and other local
government programs. Long-term prisoners, on the other hand, often have little or no connection to their place of preincarceration residence and may intend to settle in the vicinity of the prison following release. n184 Some proposals for
addressing these concerns are discussed below.
1. The "Ordinary Residence" Test

The law in most jurisdictions provides that eligible voters may vote only in the place where they are "ordinarily
resident." n185 Over the years, disputes have arisen over whether prisoners are "ordinarily resident" or have acquired a
"domicile" in the prison when the legislation does not expressly deem them to be resident elsewhere. For example, in
Dane v. Board of Registrar of Voters of Concord n186 a Massachusetts court was called on to decide the ordinary
residence of approximately three hundred inmates living in a prison in Concord, Massachusetts who attempted to
register to vote in Concord. n187 In allowing the prisoners to [*104] register on the rolls in Concord, the Registrar of
Voters apparently relied on a memorandum from the Deputy State Secretary and Director of Elections which said,
"prisoners may register to vote in the community in which the prison is located if they swear in the affidavit of
registration that they consider that residence to be their home." n188 This memorandum was meant to amplify the
legislation which provided that individuals who otherwise qualified to vote and who "shall have resided within the town
or district in which [they] may claim a right to vote, six calendar months preceding any election" were eligible to vote in
that district. n189
The court reviewed precedents from Massachusetts and from other states which indicated that, as a general rule,
individuals who are involuntarily resident in a particular location do not acquire a new domicile there. n190 However,
the court also noted that military personnel are permitted to show a change of domicile even though the move is
involuntary. n191 The court ultimately concluded that a person's involuntary residence in a particular place raises a
rebuttable presumption that the person retained his or her former domicile. n192 That presumption can be rebutted by
evidence presented by a prisoner in an affidavit of registration about the intention to make the prison location the
person's home. n193 The Register of Voters can then question the individual generally on the location of bank accounts,
past voter registrations, payment of taxes, and "other facts evidencing their attachment to the community" and can
conclude that he or she had not successfully acquired a new domicile of choice. n194
It is beyond the scope of this paper to canvas all the ways that different jurisdictions define "ordinary residence" or
domicile for voting purposes, or to come up with a definitive approach to domicile that best balances the competing
interests associated with voting by prisoners. However, a few options come to mind. One approach might be to establish
a default rule that prisoners retain their pre-incarceration domicile unless they have been incarcerated for at least five
consecutive years, n195 in which case they could elect to acquire a new domicile in the [*105] prison. n196 If they do
not elect, they would retain their prior domicile. An alternative would be to employ a rebuttable presumption like the
one adopted in Dane. However, this sort of rule would likely require more administration and entail more discretion,
leading to uneven results. A further alternative would be simply to deem prisoners to be domiciled in the prison. n197
The appeal of a threshold based on length of time in prison is that it offers consistency and predictability, is easier to
administer, and addresses some of the problems associated with allocating all prisoners to either their "home" district or
the prison district. Whatever the chosen method, it seems just that at least some long-term inmates be permitted to
register and vote in the prison's electoral district. n198
2. Prisoners Housed Out-of-State
An additional problem associated with deeming all prisoners to be residents of their pre-incarceration address arises
from the fact that states increasingly contract with each other to house prisoners from out-of-state. Therefore, prisoners
from, for example, Michigan, would be eligible to vote in a Michigan election (since Michigan was their place of
ordinary residence), yet they may be housed in a prison in Ohio and may have to enlist the Ohio prison officials to assist
them in registering to vote in Michigan. Otherwise, if postal voting was available, prisoners could write directly to the
election officials in Michigan for voting materials. n199 However, with respect to state and local elections, it is possible
that such out-of-state prisoners may be unaware that an election campaign has begun in the home state. If inmates were
considered residents in the district (and state) in which they were incarcerated, their voting could be more easily
facilitated by officials in that state. Since these transfers appear to be made for administrative convenience and costeffectiveness, and if prisoners are otherwise considered eligible to vote, it seems perverse to deny them that opportunity
simply because the state has entered into such a transfer of services agreement. A possible solution would be to deem all
out-of-state prisoners to be residents of the state in which they are incarcerated at the time of registration, a result in
keeping with census data.
3. Prisoner Residence for Census Purposes
In assessing the propriety of designating prisoners as residents of their pre-incarceration place of residence, it is useful
to inquire into the way their residence is determined for other purposes, such as the national census. In fact, the census
[*106] counts inmates as residents of the town or city in which the prison is located. n200 This determination carries

substantial financial consequences for both the "host" and the "home" district of the inmate because federal grant
funding is distributed on a per capita basis according to the median income of the various municipalities seeking
funding. For example, the population of the town of Coxsackie in rural upstate New York includes 2,100 prisoners
living in two prisons (forming 27.5% of the town's population), the majority of whom earn little if any money, a fact
which substantially drives down the median income in Coxsackie. n201 In the 1990s, Coxsackie received several grants
from the Department of Housing and Urban Development of up to $ 600,000 each, due in part to the town's prison
population. n202 This money did not go to the largely impoverished urban communities from which the majority of
Coxsackie's inmates come.
Similarly, electoral boundaries are drawn according to census figures. n203 Prisoners inflate the population of the
host community, but are not allowed to vote. n204 Therefore, in a state like New York, a combination of census rules,
incarceration patterns, and voting laws increases the voting strength of largely White, rural voters, while diluting the
voting power of African American and Latino urban voters. n205
The relationship of census data to federal funding and electoral boundaries is a controversial and changing area of
contemporary research. This paper does not seek to weigh into that debate other than to note that the non-prisoner
residents of prison towns appear to benefit in a number of ways from the existence of prisoners in their midst. The
preferred methods of counting prisoners for census purposes and for voting purposes are at odds and therefore the
appropriate policy for allocating prisoners' votes should be considered alongside these other policies. For example, if the
franchise was extended to prisoners and concerns about their votes [*107] swamping those of the rural prison district
were persuasive, n206 then their votes might appropriately be counted in their home urban districts. However, if such a
policy was adopted, the census data should also be adjusted to include those "absentee" voter/residents in the urban
districts for purposes of determining electoral districts and federal funding.
B. The Mechanics of Voting: Polling Stations, Proxies, or Postal Votes
Options available for voting by prisoners include polling stations set up in prisons either on the day of the election (if
prisoners vote in the prison constituency) or approximately ten days in advance of the election, n207 voting by proxy
through a relative or close friend in the home constituency, or absentee voting with the use of postal ballots. After
considering the benefits and disadvantages of all three of these options, researchers for both the Australian Law Reform
Commission and the Canadian Royal Commission on Electoral Reform favoured voting at polling stations within
prisons. n208 The Australian researchers found that,
The presence of a polling booth in the gaol increases the likelihood of elector participation and enables prisoners to feel
more a part of the electoral process. It also removes the possibility of any allegations (however unjustified) of
interference by prison authorities with postal votes. n209
A problem associated with proxy ballots is the fact that some prisoners do not have a close friend or relative living in
the district in which the prisoner is eligible to vote. n210 Consequently, that option was not advocated in the Canadian
and Australian reports. The Canadian researchers admit that establishing polling places in prisons is the most
administratively complex procedure for electoral officers and prison officials. n211 However, they conclude that it is
the only way to encourage and facilitate substantial voter turnout. n212 Given the current low turnout by eligible
prisoner voters in the United States, such measures could have significant impact.
C. Ancillary Rights Associated with Voting by Prisoners
A different sort of objection to prisoner voting rights is found in the notion that prisoners cannot exercise a free and
informed vote by virtue of their [*108] incarceration. In the first action brought by Richard Sauve to federal prisoner
disenfranchisement in Canada, the government sought to defend the law in part on the basis "that the integrity of the
voting process requires participation in, or at least exposure to, the interplay of ideas which exist in society at large" and
that "the conditions that prevail in penal institutions are inimical to public discussion and debate." n213 Canadian courts
have held that existing limits on prisoners' access to political campaign material, candidates, and other information
relevant to elections do not justify disenfranchisement. n214 In Belczowski v. Canada, n215 for example, Justice
Strayer stated that being informed about the particular issues in a campaign is not a prerequisite to exercising the
franchise. n216 In another case, Justice Arbour took note of the fact that the vast majority of federal and provincial
prisoners in Canada have at least some access to newspaper and television, including cable television which provides
coverage of Parliamentary debates. n217 She further noted that many Canadians "have chosen to live in a universe

figuratively not much larger than a prison cell" and that for most people, the media is their primary means of accessing
information about politics. n218
While Canadian and American law respecting prisoners' constitutional rights and judicial review of prison
conditions differ, n219 it appears that most prisoners in the United States have at least limited access to radio or
television, n220 although [*109] there is no right to have any particular level of access to the media. Under the
minimal level of scrutiny applied to prison administrative decisions, courts would likely uphold restrictions (or even
outright prohibitions) on the ability of prisoners to meet to discuss politics if they were convinced that legitimate
security interests were raised by such meetings. n221 U.S. courts are highly deferential to the judgment of prison
officials in this regard. Prison rules prohibiting prisoners from holding union meetings, prohibiting inmate solicitation
of other inmates to join the union, and banning mailings concerning the union from outside sources were upheld by the
Supreme Court as reasonable responses to legitimate security concerns. n222
Following the Canadian approach, the fact of limited access to news media, campaign materials and candidates
should not be seen as a justification to disenfranchise prisoners. However, it is appropriate to inquire into the minimal
level of access to political information and communication that should be available to prisoners in order to facilitate
meaningful access to the ballot box.
Election and prison officials in other jurisdictions have taken concrete steps to educate prisoners about their voting
rights and to facilitate the exercise of those rights. In Canada, a Royal Commission on Electoral Reform heard detailed
testimony about the procedures that were adopted by Quebec election and prison officials to disseminate voting
information to prisoners and to regulate the voting process. n223 These officials had cooperated to produce a forty-two
page manual for inmate voting that included provisions for disseminating publications from political parties, as well as
registration and voting details. They reported that the only contentious issue was whether to permit candidates access to
penal institutions. Since publication of the Royal Commission's report, Quebec now permits candidates to meet with
inmates when advance notice is given. n224 The Commission researchers concluded that elected representatives had
met with prison inmates on a number of occasions and that it was likely that security concerns associated with candidate
visits could be addressed with advance notice and planning. They concluded, however, that such meetings "are not
absolutely necessary to ensure that the inmates are well informed and able to exercise their voting rights in a
knowledgeable manner - few Canadian voters actually meet candidates." n225
In short, while liberal access to candidates, media, fora for discussion, and written information about candidates and
policies would likely encourage more prisoners to vote, only a minimal level of access to information is truly necessary
[*110] for prisoners to exercise that right. The experience in other jurisdictions reveals that when measures are taken to
educate prisoners about their rights, to disseminate information to them, to operate polls in prisons, or to assist prisoners
with postal ballots, voter turnout by prisoners will rise. n226
VII. Conclusion
On one level, voting is a symbolic, expressive act that demonstrates membership in a community. On another, it is the
centrepiece of the democratic political process and the primary way in which citizens participate in changing the
governing rules of that community. The loss of voting rights means the loss of both of these functions. For some
prisoners, the loss is keenly felt. n227 For prisoners who come from socially and economically disadvantaged
communities and who may not have participated in the electoral system in great numbers on the outside, the lack of
voting rights may feel like no great loss. However, the effect of disenfranchising prisoners is felt not just by the few
prisoners who seek out the opportunity to vote and are told they are unfit for the franchise. It touches all of us by
altering the composition of the electorate in ways that may have an effect on the formation of public policy, and by
perpetuating the symbolic and instrumental exclusion of millions of already marginalized members of society.
The repeal of prisoner disenfranchisement laws may seem like a quaint, naive notion with little hope of success in
an age when politicians compete for the badge of being "tough on crime." Furthermore, even if enfranchisement is
possible, it may be like putting a band-aid on a gaping wound of injustice, both in the criminal law and for the plight of
the disadvantaged groups whose members largely make up the prison population. n228
If the thought of treating the prisoners in many of this country's most punitive prisons n229 as citizen-voters with
legitimate interests in governance and a right to [*111] express their views through the ballot box seems difficult to
accomplish and incongruous with the current approach to prisoners, perhaps we should ask why. Might the difficulties
associated with imagining and implementing prisoner voting prompt us to re-think our approach to corrections and to

the treatment of prisoners more generally? n230 Can the United States learn something from jurisdictions such as
Canada with similar legal systems where the idea of prisoners voting has become a reality?
The repeal of prisoner disenfranchisement law will not be the solution to these larger problems, nor will it
necessarily affect prisoners' day-to-day lives appreciably. However, our society's professed commitment to liberal
democratic principles requires that we repeal the laws that treat prisoners as "temporary outcasts from our system of
rights and democracy." n231
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more than one way to think about the significance of being labelled a felon." Id. at 1898. But see Sauve v.
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"each state should allow for registration of voting rights to otherwise eligible citizens who have been convicted
of a felony once they have fully served their sentence, including any term of probation or parole." National
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enfranchisement of prisoners, the author states that:
It is unlikely that inmates will have any appreciable effect on election results. There are about 21.7 million
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Canada.
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n23. In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), Justice Marshall suggested that a fear of "subversive
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n29. United States Department of Justice, Office of the Pardon Attorney (DOJ/OPA), Civil Disabilities of
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people who have committed crimes. Because patterns of law enforcement have changed over the years, because
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disenfranchisement has also coincided with initiatives to enact felon disenfranchisement laws in at least two of
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punishment, see "To Kill or to Cure," a documentary produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
available at http://www.cbc.ca/witness/crime&punishment/index.html (June 25, & July 2, 2003).
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conventional notions of "rehabilitation" of criminals. She views imprisonment and disenfranchisement as "a
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permit prisoner disenfranchisement because he sees an amendment as the only remaining means to continue
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n77. In contrast to the United States Constitution, the Canadian constitution explicitly guarantees the right
to vote (Section 3), but the right is subject to a general limiting provision (Section 1) which means that any
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art. I, 2, cl. 1.

n79. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote
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mental capacity).

n117. See generally Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current
Prospects for Change, 18 Law & Ineq. 271 (2000) (examining the expansion and decline of non-citizen voting
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to the media and can contribute their views to the marketplace of ideas. Media coverage of prison conditions and
of prisoner views can be an important means by which the public becomes informed about the real consequences
of criminal justice policy, yet such coverage is limited. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (holding that
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n152. Id.

n153. See Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990, supra note 5, at
339 (collecting research which suggests that racial bloc voting is pervasive). African American candidates in the
South are almost never elected in districts having less than 50% African American populations. Similarly, at the
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demographics of the disenfranchised population, voter turnout rates, and political preferences of the
disenfranchised population). Andrew Shapiro has argued that it may be possible to challenge criminal
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succeed. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 550 (quoting S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982), reprinted in
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Pol'y Rev. 9, 11-12 (1999) (analyzing the stated and unstated goals of "tough on crime" policy).
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Patrick McClain, Bernard Sheehan & Lauren Butler, Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 86 Geo. L.J.
1953 (1998). Yet even on the deferential "penological objective" standard, a ban on prisoners marrying other
prisoners was found invalid as infringing on the constitutional right to marry because the exercise of that right
was not reasonably related to the penological objectives articulated. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

n220. For example, even in the highly restrictive environment of a Virginia Super-Maximum Security
Prison, inmates in the general population and in segregation are permitted to have televisions, although
television privileges may be removed as punishment. See Human Rights Watch, Red Onion State Prison: SuperMaximum Security Confinement in Virginia (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1999/redonion/.

n221. See, e.g., Mass. Prisoners Association Political Action Comm. v. Cellucci, 761 N.E. 2d 952 (2002)
(holding that the defendant governor and prison officials had articulated a reasonable basis for believing that a
political action committee formed by prisoners and non-prisoners represented a threat to institutional security,
and that banning it was necessary to avoid this threat). The Massachusetts ACLU has taken an appeal to the
Massachusetts Appeals Court on behalf of the Political Action Committee and the individual prisoners.

n222. Jones v. N. C. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977).

n223. Landreville & Lemonde, supra note 133, at 85.

n224. Ritter, supra note 169.

n225. Landreville & Lemonde, supra note 133, at 85.

n226. Turnout by prisoners in Quebec rose from approximately 40% in 1985 to 72% in 1992 after the
Quebec correctional service adopted specific procedures to facilitate inmate voting in cooperation with election
officials.

n227. For example, Richard Sauve, a former "Lifer" now on parole and the plaintiff in two voting rights
cases in Canada, described disenfranchisement as one indignity he was not willing to suffer quietly. Interview
with Richard Sauve (March 28, 2000) (notes on file with author).

n228. Having recently visited a maximum/medium security prison in New Jersey, I admit that the notion of
recognizing the humanity and legitimate stake in society of those prisoners seems incongruous with the
repressive penal approach exemplified in that "warehouse prison." For a discussion of the trend toward
warehouse prisons, see James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the
Supreme Court, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 1003 (1997). See generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners'
Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1229 (1998) (discussing prisoner's rights in
the United States since the Warren Court).

n229. Human Rights Watch reports that, as of February 2000, more than 20,000 prisoners (or 2% of the
prison population) were housed in super-maximum security facilities or units where the conditions are often "so
extreme - e.g., lack of windows, denial of reading material, a maximum of three hours a week out-of-cell time,
lack of outdoor recreation - that they can only be explained as reflecting an unwillingness to acknowledge the
inmates' basic humanity." Human Rights Watch, Out of Sight: Super-Maximum Security Confinement in the
United States (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2000/supermax/.

n230. The U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners seem to be largely ignored by
courts, legislators and prison officials in the United States, yet they may be a good place to begin the task of
envisioning a different approach to incarceration. Some relevant rules include:
Rule 60: (1) "The regime of the institution should seek to minimize any differences between prison life and life
at liberty which tend to lessen the responsibility of the prisoners or the respect due to their dignity as human
beings."

Rule 61: "The treatment of prisoners should emphasize not their exclusion from the community, but their
continuing part in it... . Steps should be taken to safeguard, to the maximum extent compatible with the law and
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Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977),
available at http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/prisons/un-smrs.htm.
n231. Sauve No. 2, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para. 62 (noting the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of this
assumption).

